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Considering Legitimacy 
GILLIAN E. METZGER*  
ABSTRACT 
This Article on Richard Fallon’s Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court 
focuses on public acceptance of the Supreme Court’s authority, what Fallon 
calls sociological legitimacy. After setting out Fallon’s accounts of legitimacy 
and constitutional argumentation, the Article looks at public opinion data and 
political science scholarship on the extent to which the Court’s decisions affect 
public acceptance of the Court. It then turns to the normative question of 
whether, even if the Court’s decisions may undermine its sociological legiti-
macy, that impact is a legally legitimate factor for the Court to consider. The 
Article argues that strategic consideration of the Court’s public legitimacy can 
be an appropriate factor in the Justices’ decision making, but such considera-
tion may end up actually harming the Court’s reputation if undertaken openly 
and candidly as Fallon would seem to require.  
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. FALLON’S ACCOUNT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357  
A. Multiple Legitimacies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357  
B. The Practice of Constitutional Adjudication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359  
C. A Sympathetic Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361  
II. SOCIOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
ADJUDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364  
A. Politicized Decision Making and Public Acceptance of the 
Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364  
B. Is the Court’s Consideration of Sociological Legitimacy 
Defensible?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370  
C. Candor and Sociological Legitimacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378  
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Law School. Special thanks to 
Dick Fallon for writing such a wonderful book, to Randy Barnett for the invitation to participate in the 
Cooley Symposium, to participants in the Columbia Law School faculty workshop for their helpful 
comments, and to Tyler Finn for exceptional research assistance. © 2020, Gillian E. Metzger. 
353 
It would be hard to imagine a more auspicious time for a symposium on 
Richard Fallon’s Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court. The legitimacy of 
the Supreme Court is at the forefront of political and public life to an extent not 
seen for decades.1 
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Coming Storm over the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/opinion/kavanaugh-supreme-court-conservative.html 
[https://perma.cc/QL7Q-BTG5]. 
To be sure, attacks on the Supreme Court from both sides of 
the political spectrum have been growing for years.2 
See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Sebelius and the Election, NAT’L REV. (July 30, 2012), https://www. 
nationalreview.com/2012/07/sebelius-and-election-eric-r-claeys/ [https://perma.cc/U5RY-ZNUN] (criticizing 
Chief Justice Roberts for violating principles of statutory interpretation in order to uphold the 
constitutionality of Obamacare); Richard Hasen, The Chief Justice’s Long Game, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/opinion/the-chief-Justices-long-game.html [https://perma.cc/ 
VPC9-TNAM] (critiquing Shelby Cty. v. Holder as a dramatic reversal of constitutional law hidden “behind 
a cloak of judicial minimalism”); Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: The Supreme Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 
29, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/29/opinion/abroad-at-home-the-supreme-power.html [https:// 
perma.cc/P9ZA-C9ZK] (labelling the Rehnquist Court “a band of radical judicial activists determined to 
impose on the Constitution their notion of a proper system of government”); Howard Slugh, Obergefell’s 
Toxic Judicial Legacy, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/obergefell- 
judges-invent-rights/ [https://perma.cc/5G3S-GF4B] (complaining that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
in Obergefell v. Hodges encouraged “judges [to] read inventive new rights into the Constitution”) For a 
discussion of the criticism directed at the Warren Court’s judicial activism, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL 
OF THE PEOPLE 244, 257–58 (2009). 
But today challenges to the 
Court are at new levels, pushed there by the deep political divides over the courts 
that were evident in the recent political battles over Justice Kavanaugh’s confir-
mation and Judge Merrick Garland’s failed nomination, and the resultant shift to 
the right of the Court’s membership.3 
See Linda Greenhouse, The Broken Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/supreme-court-janus-unions.html [https://perma.cc/5NQQ-NS4R]; 
Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is the Supreme Court Facing A Legitimacy Crisis?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 1 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the-supreme-court-facing-a- 
legitimacy-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/8UK6-75D9]; Matthew Yglesias, Brett Kavanaugh’s Confirmation 
Will Delegitimize the Supreme Court—And That’s Good, VOX (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.vox.com/ 
2018/10/5/17941312/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-legitimacy [https://perma.cc/SLX8-43VX]. 
Both conservative and liberal commenta-
tors portray the Supreme Court’s legitimacy as under threat, though they diverge 
dramatically in their accounts of the source of that threat and how the Court 
should respond.4 
Compare, e.g., William McGurn, John Roberts’s ‘Illegitimate’ Court, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/john-robertss-illegitimate-court-11558989312 [https://perma.cc/ 
SW3S-6EWG] (arguing that not overturning Roe out of fear of political response undercuts the Court’s 
legitimacy), and Ilya Shapiro, How the Supreme Court Undermines Its Own Legitimacy, WASH. 
EXAMINER (July 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/how-the-supreme-court- 
undermines-its-own-legitimacy [https://perma.cc/Q7FR-X949] (arguing that deciding cases with an eye 
to political repercussions destroys the public belief that the Court is moved by law and not politics, 
which is central to its legitimacy), with Leah Litman et al., We Ought to Be Concerned About Preserving 
the Political Order of the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (June 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/opinions/yes-the-publics-perception-of-the-supreme-court-matters/2019/06/18/5b25128c-91e6-11e9- 
b58a-a6a9afaa0e3e_story.html [https://perma.cc/9CTE-WR3L] (arguing it is legitimate for the Court to 
take its public legitimacy into account). 
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scholarship as well.5 Court-packing, long criticized as an executive power over-
reach by FDR, has newfound progressive advocates, and support for Supreme 
Court term limits is growing in many quarters.6 
See Akhil Reed Amar & Steven G. Calabresi, Term Limits for the High Court, WASH. POST (Aug. 
9, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/08/09/term-limits-for-the-high-court/ 
646134cd-8e13-4166-9474-5f53be633d7c/ [https://perma.cc/94SE-WLMH]; Ian Ayres & John Fabian 
Witt, Democrats Need a Plan B for the Supreme Court. Here’s One Option., WASH. POST (July 27, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/democrats-need-a-plan-b-for-the-supreme-court-heres- 
one-option/2018/07/27/4c77fd4e-91a6-11e8-b769-e3fff17f0689_story.html?utm_term=.16fe4a1612f6 
[https://perma.cc/SE7L-KXF3]; Ezra Klein, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Case for 18-Year Supreme 
Court Terms, VOX (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/26/18155093/ 
ruth-bader-ginsburg-supreme-court-term-limits [https://perma.cc/ZQK9-QRND]. 
These concerns around the Court’s legitimacy came to a head recently with 
two filings in NYS Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York, a case involving 
a Second Amendment challenge to a New York City regulation limiting the trans-
portation of guns to training facilities. A brief from five Democratic Senators 
argued that new state legislation and repeal of the regulation made the case moot 
and warned the Court about ignoring established justiciability rules to advance a 
conservative political agenda.7 After describing ongoing conservative campaigns 
to influence the Court and growing public views of the Court as political, the brief 
concluded: “The Supreme Court is not well. And the people know it. Perhaps the 
Court can heal itself before the public demands it be ‘restructured in order to 
reduce the influence of politics.’”8 All fifty-three Republican Senators wrote an 
angry letter to the Court in response, accusing their Democratic colleagues of 
“openly threaten[ing] th[e] Court with political retribution if it failed to dismiss 
the petition as moot.”9 Urging the Court not to be “cowed,” the Republicans 
promised to protect the Court against court-packing.10 In addition to providing 
some high drama to enliven the Supreme Court’s summer break in 2019, the com-
peting filings demonstrated how the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is becoming a 
central theme of political debate.11 
See Linda Greenhouse, Who Cares About the Supreme Court’s “Legitimacy”?, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/opinion/supreme-court-census-roberts.html [https://perma.cc/ 
WL9F-AQ84]. 
Given this maelstrom, understanding the nature and basis of the Supreme 
Court’s legitimacy is of particular importance. What do we mean when we say 
the Court’s legitimacy may be in called into question? Should this be a real 
worry? To what extent do the decisions of the Court affect its legitimacy? If we 
5. See generally, e.g., Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148 
(2019); Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 (2019) 
(reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (2018)); Suzanna 
Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It) (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 19- 
30, 2019). 
6.
7. Brief of Senator Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents at 12–16, 
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 86 F. Supp. 3d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 18-280). 
8. Id. at 18. 
9. Letter from Senator Mitch McConnell et al. to Scott S. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court of the U.S. 1 
(Aug. 29, 2019). 
10. Id. at 2. 
11.
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recognize the Court’s political and ideological character, does that mean constitu-
tional adjudication—indeed, the Court’s decision making writ large—is necessar-
ily illegitimate? And, perhaps most pointedly, is it legitimate for the Court to take 
concerns about its legitimacy into account in deciding cases? 
Many of these questions lie at the heart of Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme 
Court. The book is animated by Fallon’s desire to show how constitutional adju-
dication can be a legitimate enterprise, notwithstanding that much of the 
Constitution’s meaning is indeterminate and the Justices inevitably draw on 
broader moral, political, and ideological concerns in interpreting it. Fallon deftly 
weaves together interdisciplinary and conceptual work on legitimacy and linguis-
tic meaning with details of constitutional methodology and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretive practices. Of particular value is Fallon’s identification of three dis-
tinct types of legitimacy as well as his account of constitutional argumentation. 
He portrays constitutional argumentation as a practice constrained by shared 
understandings and norms of good-faith, reasoned argumentation in which the 
Justices inevitably—and appropriately—draw on moral, political and ideological 
judgments.12 
Yet one area of Fallon’s analysis remains unsatisfying, and that concerns what 
he calls sociological legitimacy. By sociological legitimacy, Fallon means broad 
public acceptance of the authority of the Constitution and of the Court, which 
undergirds and enables constitutional adjudication.13 But he does not unpack the 
concept of sociological legitimacy in detail—for example, to address problems 
created by multiple and diverse publics or to specify how public acceptance of 
the Supreme Court is affected by the Court’s actions. Moreover, his focus is on 
explaining how constitutional adjudication can be an internally, morally, and 
legally legitimate practice rather than on how the Court can or should respond to 
sociological legitimacy concerns. We are left in an uncertain position, told that 
sociological legitimacy is a basic prerequisite for legitimate constitutional adjudi-
cation and warned that the Court’s sociological legitimacy is at great risk, yet 
unsure about how such legitimacy emerges or what, if anything, the Court can do 
to secure it. 
In what follows, I first describe Fallon’s insightful account of different forms 
of legitimacy and the practice of constitutional adjudication, focusing in particu-
lar on his account of sociological legitimacy and the questions it raises. I then 
turn to examining survey data and political science scholarship to assess, descrip-
tively, the extent to which the Court’s decisions may call public acceptance of the 
Court into question. Finally, I turn to the normative question of whether strategic 
consideration of the Court’s public standing and legitimacy can be an appropriate 
factor in the Justices’ decision making. I argue that judicial consideration of 
sociological legitimacy can be legally legitimate, even under Fallon’s account. 
The harder question is whether such consideration will backfire and end up 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 46–50. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 16–17, 29–31. 
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harming the Court’s reputation, at least if strategic decision making is undertaken 
openly and candidly as Fallon’s commitment to good-faith, reasonable argumen-
tation might seem to require. 
I. FALLON’S ACCOUNT 
As Fallon himself states at the outset, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme 
Court “is an ambitious book.”14 In it, Fallon dissects the concept of legitimacy, 
offers accounts of constitutional interpretation and constitutional theory in the 
Supreme Court, analyzes the constraints the Court faces in undertaking constitu-
tional adjudication, and assesses whether constitutional decision making at the 
Court today is legally and morally legitimate. Critical to Fallon’s project is his 
careful analysis of legitimacy as a metaconcept encompassing sociological, 
moral, and legal legitimacy, as well as his account of the prerequisites for legiti-
mate constitutional adjudication by the Court. 
A. Multiple Legitimacies 
Fallon begins the book by setting forth three distinct but related understandings 
of legitimacy: sociological legitimacy, moral legitimacy, and legal legitimacy. 
“Sociological legitimacy involves prevailing public attitudes towards govern-
ment, institutions, or decisions.”15 Fallon describes the question of sociological 
legitimacy as “whether people (and, if so, how many of them) believe that the 
law or the constitution deserves to be respected or obeyed for reasons that go 
beyond fear of adverse consequences.”16 Often equated with public acceptance of 
or institutional loyalty towards the Court, sociological legitimacy is what under-
lies legal compliance in practice; the more the legal system is viewed as legiti-
mate, the more people will voluntarily adhere to its requirements.17 
Moral legitimacy, in turn, is not concerned with “whether the Justices or any-
one else in fact respects or endeavors to obey the Constitution or laws of the 
United States. It is, rather, whether . . . people ought to do so or whether govern-
ment officials are morally justified in coercing compliance.”18 On Fallon’s 
account, moral legitimacy takes two forms, reflecting that we live “in a world in 
which unanimous agreement on the requirements of perfect justice cannot reason-
ably be expected.”19 There is, first, moral legitimacy as “a minimum” which 
“[g]overnments must satisfy . . . in order to deserve support and respect and to 
justify their officials in exercising coercive force.”20 And there is also moral 
14. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT ix (2018). 
15. Id. at 21. 
16. Id. at 22. 
17. See id. at 23; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 58–59, 63 (1990) (discussing 
empirical evidence indicating that “legitimacy has a significant effect on compliance,” although noting 
that, “[i]f citizens feel they have been treated unfairly, their behavior is less strongly influenced by their 
judgments about the legitimacy of legal authorities”). 
18. FALLON, supra note 14, at 23. 
19. Id. at 34. 
20. Id. 
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legitimacy “as a relative ideal,” “involving mixed elements of substantive justice, 
democratic decision making, and procedural fairness,” to which “governments 
and their officials should . . . aspire to move their regimes closer.”21 
Finally, there is legal legitimacy, which goes to “whether the Justices’ deci-
sions accord with or are permissible under constitutional or legal norms.”22). For 
Fallon, the critical feature of legal legitimacy is its orientation inside the legal 
system. He uses legal legitimacy “to mark judgments based solely on a legal sys-
tem’s internally recognized norms.”23 As a result, the ultimate measure of legal 
legitimacy in the United States is the “Constitution and surrounding norms of 
interpretation” that form the backbone of the legal system.24 
Among these three dimensions of legitimacy, sociological legitimacy is the 
most distinct. Both moral and legal legitimacy have a strong normative compo-
nent, they speak to what a court ought to do for its decision making to be legiti-
mate. Indeed, Fallon underscores the close association of these two forms of 
legitimacy by arguing that “the moral legitimacy of decisions by the Supreme 
Court will normally depend on their legal legitimacy.”25 As he puts it: “If the 
Constitution is law that legally binds the Supreme Court, and if it is also mini-
mally morally legitimate”26—which Fallon concludes it is27—“then whether the 
Justices have behaved morally legitimately will almost necessarily depend on 
whether the Justices have acted legally correctly or legitimately.”28) As a result, 
moral legitimacy as an independent idea seems to do little work for Fallon. 
Sociological legitimacy is factual rather than normative; it speaks to whether 
the public views the legal system as legitimate and not whether they ought to so 
view it. Yet sociological legitimacy bears a critical linkage to legal legitimacy. 
Fallon emphasizes that the Constitution’s sociological legitimacy, its popular ac-
ceptance, is what “g[ives] it legal legitimacy.”29 As he puts it: “The ultimate mea-
sure of legality in our legal system—as in any other—inheres in currently 
accepted standards for identifying past events as possessing legal authority. . . . 
[W]hat ultimately matters today . . . is that nearly everyone continues to accept 
the Constitution . . . as valid, binding law.”30 Moreover, “the bounds of acceptable 
legal judgment have partly sociological foundations” as well; popular acceptance 
shapes what counts as a legally reasonable argument and what falls outside the 
pale.31 
21. Id. at 34–35. 
22. Id. at 35. 
23. FALLON, supra note 14, at 35–36. 
24. Id. at 36. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. See id. at 29. 
28. Id. at 36. 
29. FALLON, supra note 14, at 86. 
30. Id. at 85. 
31. Id. at 40. 
358 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:353 
Despite his equation of moral and legal legitimacy, Fallon also suggests that 
legal legitimacy as well as sociological legitimacy are to some extent dependent 
on moral legitimacy. Both “can be compromised and made vulnerable by moral 
fissures within a society,”32 if these fissures are deep and wide enough to undercut 
popular acceptance of the Constitution and reasonable legal disagreement. As 
Fallon puts it: “When we believe others’ moral views to be not just mistaken but 
unreasonable, we will almost inevitably conclude that judicial decisions that 
reflect those views . . . are unworthy of respect.”33 
Legitimacy is a central concern of Fallon’s book. Yet as Fallon’s own analysis 
reveals, the term is protean with multiple possible meanings that are often con-
flated. It is worth asking: why invoke legitimacy at all? Or, in the words of David 
Strauss: “Why not just talk about moral right and wrong, or about legal right and 
wrong, or about whether a particular law or legal system is generally accepted by 
a population? Using the term ‘legitimacy’ only adds the potential for confusion; 
why not dispense with it?”34 Strauss’s answer is that to call a law or a judicial de-
cision illegitimate is to suggest not just that it is wrong, but further that it does not 
deserve obedience.35 
Fallon resists the idea that legitimacy is firmly tied to obedience, suggesting 
that we may have an obligation to obey an illegitimate decision.36 Instead, he 
defines legitimacy in terms of being worthy of respect.37 But his prime response 
is to reject the idea that correctness can be equated with legitimacy at all. He 
repeatedly insists that a decision can be legally wrong and yet legally legitimate, 
for example, underscoring that ample room exists for reasonable debate and dis-
agreement over constitutional meaning.38 Fallon analogizes legal legitimacy to 
the concepts of jurisdiction and discretion, both of which connote authority to 
make decisions that may be wrong. A court does not lose jurisdiction when it 
issues a decision that is reversed for legal error, and the idea of “abuse of discre-
tion” signals a decision that is not just mistaken but outside the pale of accepted 
decision making. So too an erroneous decision could still be legally legitimate 
provided the court “had lawful power to decide” it, “rested its decision only on 
considerations that it had lawful power to take into account,” and “reached an 
outcome that fell within the bounds of reasonable legal judgment.”39 
B. The Practice of Constitutional Adjudication 
This distinction between correctness and legitimacy is central to Fallon’s core 
preoccupation in the book, which is to articulate an account of legitimate 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 158. 
34. David A Strauss, Reply: Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1854 (2005). 
35. Id. 
36. See FALLON, supra note 14, at 41. 
37. See id. at 8. 
38. See id. at 38, 43–44. 
39. Id. at 39–40. 
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Supreme Court constitutional adjudication. Here, Fallon’s focus is on moral and 
legal legitimacy, although sociological legitimacy concerns—the fear that the 
public will come to see the Court as an ideologically-driven institution no differ-
ent from the political branches—are a brooding presence in the background.40 
In Fallon’s portrayal, the central challenge is to explain how constitutional 
adjudication can be a lawful, constrained activity, while also acknowledging that 
it is an activity laced with indeterminacy and inevitably affected by the Justices’ 
moral values and ideological commitments. His analysis proceeds incrementally, 
almost methodically were it not for the sophistication of his arguments. Fallon 
begins by showcasing the Constitution’s multiple meanings, the inability of origi-
nal public meaning to produce linguistic determinacy, and the new sources of in-
terpretive authority that emerge over time. Having established the ground of 
constitutional indeterminacy, Fallon devotes himself to explaining why constitu-
tional adjudication is nonetheless a legally and morally legitimate enterprise. 
On Fallon’s account, “American constitutional law is a practice . . . constituted 
by the shared understandings, expectations, and intentions of those who accept 
the constitutional order” and participate in it.41 He emphasizes that as practices 
go, American constitutional adjudication is “a relatively fluid and an open one” 
that inherently draws on “the domains of moral, political and prudential judg-
ment.”42 To be legitimate, this practice must look backwards, recognizing “the 
paramount authority of the Constitution” and taking seriously past elucidation of 
constitutional meaning through historical practice and precedent.43 But it must 
simultaneously look forwards, drawing on “forward-looking considerations of 
substantive justice and procedural fairness”44 to make “the morally and practi-
cally best decisions that the law allows.”45 Putting these factors together, Fallon 
views legitimate constitutional decision making as turning on “whether the 
Justices employ reasonable and consistent decision making methodologies, ex-
hibit fidelity to legitimate prior authorities, show morally good substantive judg-
ment in establishing law for the future, and maintain a fair distribution of political 
authority among courts and other institutions.”46 Fallon implements this general 
instruction through a reflective equilibrium model for constitutional adjudication. 
Judges should approach constitutional adjudication with a strong presumption in 
favor of the “methodological or interpretive principles” they had previously 
embraced, but they should be open to adjusting those principles in light of “sub-
stantive constitutional judgments” they develop from the case at hand.47 Through 
40. See id. at 155, 157. 
41. Id. at 88. For another prominent account of constitutional adjudication as a practice involving 
certain forms (“modalities”) of argument that are considered legitimate, see PHILLIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). 
42. FALLON, supra note 14, at 91. 
43. Id. at 98. 
44. Id. at 82. 
45. Id. at 10. 
46. Id. at 167. 
47. Id. at 144–45. 
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“a back-and-forth” process of reflective adjustment, Fallon seeks to provide 
room for both principled decision making and case-specific constitutional 
convictions.48 
Recognizing the open-endedness of constitutional adjudication under his 
description, Fallon underscores a number of external constraints: the governmen-
tal structure that the Constitution creates, political checks on the court, and the 
institutional demands of a multimember body are some. But the primary con-
straints he emphasizes are internal: the norms that govern the practice of constitu-
tional adjudication and demarcate the bounds of reasonable constitutional 
argument. Here is where Fallon’s distinction between legitimacy and correctness 
proves pivotal; he insists that the Justices may disagree with a constitutional inter-
pretation but nonetheless accept that it is legitimate in the sense of representing a 
reasonable constitutional argument. “[T]he Justices can share standards that call 
for the exercise of moral or practical judgment . . . yet disagree about what good 
judgment requires.”49 
For Fallon, a critical norm of reasonable constitutional argumentation, and 
thus of legitimate constitutional adjudication, is good faith. As Fallon puts it: 
[W]e can respect Justices with whom we disagree, provided that the disagree-
ment is principled. We can even respect Justices who change their minds, so 
long as they provide reasons . . . . But our respect for the Justices—and our ap-
praisal of the Court’s decisions and its institutional legitimacy—would rightly 
suffer grievously if we came to view the Justices as cynical manipulators 
whose arguments possess no integrity.50 
This requirement of argumentative good faith leads Fallon ultimately to offer a 
mixed assessment of whether the Court’s current constitutional adjudication meet 
the requirements of legitimacy. In his view, “current Supreme Court practice 
appears to include more than a few deviations from interpretive methodological 
regularity and argumentative good faith.”51 Yet the tenor of the book as a whole 
is far more optimistic, defending the potential for morally and legally legitimate 
constitutional adjudication and concluding that such legitimacy could obtain 
today “with relatively modest and imaginable changes” to current practice.52 
C. A Sympathetic Critique 
I find many features of Fallon’s account compelling, in particular his insistence 
on the indeterminacy of constitutional meaning and the inevitable role that moral 
commitments play in constitutional adjudication. To contend otherwise is, as he  
48. FALLON, supra note 14, at 144. 
49. Id. at 95. 
50. Id. at 12–13. 
51. Id. at 173. 
52. Id. 
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argues, “to blink reality.”53 I also agree with his rejection of both originalism and 
the cynical realist view under which judges’ votes and positions are determined 
solely by their ideological preferences. And I agree with Fallon’s view that con-
stitutional law is a practice constituted by the shared assumptions and understand-
ings of participants. As he repeatedly notes, there are many relatively easy 
constitutional questions where judicial agreement is broad or at least judges are 
not divided along ideological or political lines. 
I am less sanguine, however, that those shared assumptions and easy cases can 
establish the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decision making in 
far more contentious and ideologically-divided contexts. In such contexts, we 
may not be able to see those we disagree with as adhering to reasonable standards 
of constitutional adjudication but simply reaching different conclusions than we 
do. In this regard, Fallon’s account seems likely to suffer from the level-of- 
generality problem that plagues many a constitutional theory.54 Few may disagree 
on the rules of constitutional adjudication that Fallon sets out at the abstract and 
general level at which he posits them—for example, that the Constitution is “par-
amount authority . . . in all cases” or that “powerful legal and moral considera-
tions can trump” adherence to settled law. But drill down further in contested 
cases and profound methodological disagreements along with claims of unprin-
cipled decision making quickly rise to the fore, raising the question of how much 
agreement really exists on the bounds of reasonable constitutional argumenta-
tion.55 The open-endedness of constitutional adjudication under Fallon’s descrip-
tion likely exacerbates the problem, as it means the Justices are regularly drawing 
on values and commitments in particular cases that others may not share. 
My bigger concern centers on the concept of sociological legitimacy and how 
it fits into Fallon’s project. Although he repeatedly acknowledges the interde-
pendency between sociological legitimacy on the one hand and moral and legal 
legitimacy on the other, Fallon offers little sustained analysis of this relationship. 
He notes that issuing a legally and morally illegitimate constitutional decision 
does not undermine public acceptance of the Court.56 But at the same time, he is 
plainly concerned that growing political polarization may undercut public per-
ceptions of constitutional adjudication as a legitimate enterprise, given the close 
correlation between political ideology and constitutional views.57 “In a society in 
53. Id. at 147. 
54. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1062–63 (1990) (describing how a constitutional theory centered on original 
intent raises questions regarding whose intent matters and at what level of generality). 
55. Compare, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–98 (2015) (Justice Kennedy’s 
majority view of how the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted), with 
id. at 2632–34 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justice Thomas’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause); 
compare also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 523–25 (2014) (Justice Breyer’s majority view of 
the role of historical practice in constitutional interpretation), with id. at 571–73 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(Justice Scalia’s view on the use of historical practice in constitutional interpretation). 
56. See FALLON, supra note 14, at 156. 
57. See id. at 157. 
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which the ideological gulfs are too wide, perceived illegitimacy in Supreme 
Court decision making may become . . . [a] familiar . . . fact of life.”58 
Descriptively, then, this creates a puzzle: to what extent do contentious politi-
cal and ideologically-laden constitutional decisions undermine public confidence 
in the Court? As important, however, is the normative question that follows: to 
what extent should the Justices “allow other people’s perceptions of the moral le-
gitimacy of their decisions to affect their actual decision making”?59 At the end 
of the book, Fallon signals that he believes the Justices should be more attentive 
to the political repercussions and political context of their decision making. In 
particular, he urges the Court to exercise greater restraint when it comes to inva-
lidating legislation, especially at the federal level, and insists that “the ideal of 
moral reasonableness in judicial decision making includes considerations involv-
ing the fair allocation of political power.”60 Fallon justifies this position on 
grounds of democratic legitimacy and respect for the constitutional views of pop-
ularly elected branches, yet it is clear that he also hopes the Court will retreat 
from high-visibility political debates.61 Fallon never explains, however, how 
efforts by the Court to avoid political confrontations fit within the norms of rea-
sonable constitutional adjudication. Moreover, as Tara Grove argues in her recent 
review of Fallon’s book, fitting these two together may be no easy feat. In her 
view, strategic voting based on factors external to the case at hand “is antithetical 
to the way in which many of us conceive of Supreme Court decisionmaking” and 
“violates norms of our constitutional practice.”62 
Indeed, Fallon’s call for judicial restraint in invalidating legislation showcases 
this tension. Scholars have long debated whether restraint in invalidating legisla-
tion is proper as a matter of substantive constitutional law—whether it appropri-
ately respects the Constitution’s principles of democratic accountability and the 
constitutional role of courts, or instead represents a failure by courts to adequately 
protect individuals against majority oppression.63 These substantive arguments 
plainly fall within the realm of reasonable constitutional debate. But the strategic 
argument that Justices should avoid invalidating legislation to protect the Court’s 
institutional standing is thought by many to be outside the legal pale.64 
58. Id. at 158. 
59. Id. at 13. 
60. Id. at 129. 
61. See id. at 159–62. 
62. Grove, supra note 5, at 2263. 
63. The jurisprudence and scholarship relevant to this debate is vast. For relatively recent entrants, 
see generally RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2016) (arguing against judicial 
restraint in invalidating legislation); Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of 
Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2013) (arguing in favor). For 
the classic argument in favor of judicial restraint, see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 136 (1893). 
64. See Grove, supra note 5, at 2259–60, 2269 (suggesting that such an action would be legally 
illegitimate); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Paradox of the Obamacare Decision: How Can the Federal 
Government Have Limited Unlimited Power?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1993, 1997 (2013). 
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II. SOCIOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
The rest of this Article focuses on descriptive and normative dimensions of 
sociological legitimacy. I begin with the descriptive dimension, reviewing politi-
cal science scholarship on whether the Supreme Court’s public standing is 
affected by politically and ideologically contested decisions. I then turn to the 
normative dimension, assessing whether strategic concerns about preserving pub-
lic confidence in the Supreme Court are a legitimate factor for the Justices to con-
sider in constitutional adjudication. Putting the two together, my overall 
conclusion is mixed. In my view, concerns about preserving public support for 
the Court fall within the bounds of reasonable constitutional adjudication—both 
as currently undertaken and in the form that Fallon advocates. The bigger prob-
lem is that overt consideration of the impact of a decision on the Court’s standing 
may prove self-defeating by leading the public to view the Justices as little more 
than politicians in robes, thereby undercutting the very institutional legitimacy 
the Justices sought to preserve. An alternative would be for the Justices to take 
sociological legitimacy into account, but only sub rosa. Yet not only does that 
approach raise serious concerns about judicial candor, it also stands in tension 
with Fallon’s prime commitment that the Justices must engage in constitutional 
adjudication in good faith. 
A. Politicized Decision Making and Public Acceptance of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court is increasingly divided along ideological and partisan 
lines. Since 2010, when Justice Kagan replaced Justice Stevens, “all of the 
Supreme Court’s Republican-nominated Justices have been to the right of 
Democratic-nominated Justices.”65 According to Neal Devins and Lawrence 
Baum, this is a new phenomenon; “the Court never had clear ideological blocs 
that coincided with party lines” before now.66 
Id.; Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, If the Supreme Court is Nakedly Political, Can it be Just?, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 9, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court-nominee-trump. 
html [https://perma.cc/3PTH-BXYL]. 
Although there remains some divi-
sion among the conservative justices—notably, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh 
voted together only 70% of the time last term—the Court shifted further to the 
right when Justice Kennedy, a conservative justice who voted with liberals in 
some highly salient cases, was replaced with the more reliably conservative 
Justice Kavanaugh.67 
DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 65, at 4, 6; Lee Epstein et al., Replacing Justice Kennedy 6–7 
WASH. U. L. RESEARCH (Oct. 8, 2018), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/ReplacingJusticeKennedy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4NXF-8U6Y]; Amelia Thompson-Deveaux, The Supreme Court Might Have Three 
Swing Justices Now, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 2, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme- 
court-might-have-three-swing-justices-now/ [https://perma.cc/9DMF-Q747]. 
Party-line voting dominates in Supreme Court confirmation 
battles and the ideological division between liberal and conservative justices has 
grown significantly.68 The result is that the Court “has come to be rigidly divided 
65. NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP 4 (2019). 
66.
67.
68. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 65, at 2, 6. 
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by both ideology and party,” with the liberal votes in close cases overwhelmingly 
coming from Democratic-appointed justices and conservative votes coming from 
Republican-appointed ones.69 
Many worry that the Court’s sociological legitimacy will erode as the Court 
increasingly reflects our current polarized climate.70 
See, e.g., Grove, supra note 5, at 2240; Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 2–3; Sherry, supra 
note 5, at 2; Epstein & Posner, supra note 66; Kevin McMahon, Is the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy 
Undermined in a Polarized Age?, THECONVERSATION (July 7, 2018), http://theconversation.com/is-the- 
supreme-courts-legitimacy-undermined-in-a-polarized-age-99473 [https://perma.cc/G4KK-FHYL]; Amelia 
Thomson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is the Supreme Court Facing a Legitimacy Crisis?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the-supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis/ [https:// 
perma.cc/AW66-SWRC]. 
Even Justice Kagan has 
voiced this concern, warning that people “will reject the Court and say, you 
know, we don’t view it as legitimate anymore” because they see the Court “as 
just an extension of the political process.”71 
Ian Millhauser, Kagan Warns that the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy is in Danger, THINK 
PROGRESS (Sept. 17, 2018.), https://thinkprogress.org/justice-kagan-warns-that-the-supreme-courts- 
legitimacy-is-in-danger-2de1192d5636/ [https://perma.cc/937S-JPPA]. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court enjoys 
“strong and enduring” public support.72 According to a September 2019 Gallup 
survey, 54% approve and 42% disapprove of how the Court is handling its job, 
while an August 2019 Pew survey reported that 62% of Americans say they view 
the Court favorably.73 
Gallup Historical Trends: Supreme Court, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court. 
aspx [https://perma.cc/9WZ3-DWWM] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020); Claire Brockway & Bradley Jones, 
Partisan Gap Widens in Views of the Supreme Court, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www. 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/07/partisan-gap-widens-in-views-of-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma. 
cc/5SEF-8PDL]. 
These numbers are substantially up from 2016, when 42% 
approved and 52% disapproved of how the Court was handling its job, and only 
48% of Americans had a favorable view of the Court, compared to 43% who had 
an unfavorable view.74 
Gallup Historical Trends: Supreme Court, supra note 73; Negative Views of Supreme Court at 
Record High, Driven by Republican Dissatisfaction, PEW RES. CTR. (July 29, 2015), http://www.people- 
press.org/2015/07/29/negative-views-of-supreme-court-at-record-high-driven-by-republican-dissatisfaction/ 
[https://perma.cc/BC3V-www4]. 
Public support for the Court is also higher and more con-
sistent than support for Congress or the President.75 
On the other hand, survey data on public views of the Court do provide some 
basis for concern. Overall, “confidence in the court has been declining over the 
past 30 years.”76 After largely being in the 45%–50% range from 1973 to the 
early 2000s, the percentage reporting a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in 
the Court has been between 30–40% since 2006.77 Even more striking, Pew found 
69. Epstein & Posner, supra note 66. 
70.
71.
72. Joseph Daniel Ura & Alison Higgins Merrill, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion, in THE 




75. Gallup Historical Trends: Supreme Court, supra note 73; Ura & Merrill, supra note 72, at 435. 
76. Thomson-Deveaux & Roeder, supra note 70. 
77. Although capturing overall trends, these ranges hide fluctuation in confidence in the Court, 
sometimes year-to-year. Gallup Historical Trends: Supreme Court, supra note 73. 
2020] CONSIDERING LEGITIMACY 365 
that unfavorable opinions of the Supreme Court reached a 30-year high in 2015, 
with seven in ten Americans saying that Supreme Court Justices “are often influ-
enced by their own political views” in deciding cases and only 24% saying that 
Justices “generally put their political views aside.”78 
Negative Views of Supreme Court at Record High, Driven by Republican Dissatisfaction, PEW 
RES. CTR. (July 29, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/07/29/negative-views-of-supreme-court- 
at-record-high-driven-by-republican-dissatisfaction/ [https://perma.cc/BC3V-www4]. 
In addition, the recent 
upticks in approval of the Court largely predate Justice Kavanaugh’s confirma-
tion, which entailed contentious hearings and created a more solid conservative 
majority than had previously existed.79 Indeed, the Court’s approval rating in 
Pew’s survey declined from 66% in April 2018 to 62% in August 2019,80 
Democracy and Government, the U.S. Political System, Elected Officials and Governmental 
Institutions, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 26, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/04/26/1-democracy- 
and-government-the-u-s-political-system-elected-officials-and-governmental-institutions/#views-of-congress- 
and-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/HEE9-7CZZ]; Brockway & Jones, supra note 73. 
although as noted above Gallup’s polling shows a slight improvement in the num-
ber approving of the Court in September 2019 compared to recent years.81 
Particularly troubling is the significant partisan divide evident in public views 
of the Court. Republican and Democratic approval of the Court have long varied 
to some extent, but in 2019 this divide is particularly stark, with 75% of 
Republicans and Republican-leaning independents having a favorable view of 
the Court compared to only 49% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning inde-
pendents.82 This 26 point divide represents the largest partisan gap in two 
decades.83 Moreover, the 2018–2019 term of the Court was a relatively quiet one, 
with few ideologically or politically charged cases.84 
Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapanio, A Supreme Court Term Marked by Shifting Alliances and 
Surprise Votes, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019.) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/us/supreme-court- 
decisions.html [https://perma.cc/AM86-DRTX]. 
If the Court hears more 
politically salient cases and resolves them in a consistently conservative direc-
tion, this partisan divide is likely to worsen.85 
Yet whether approval rates for the Supreme Court are good proxies for public 
acceptance of it is a matter of some debate. Political science scholarship has long 
differentiated between “specific support” and “diffuse support” for the Court. 
Specific support reflects individuals’ favorable evaluation of the Court’s deci-
sions and performance and is captured by approval rates, while diffuse support 
reflects individuals’ willingness to accept the Court’s decisions even when they 
don’t agree with the results it reaches.86 Diffuse support is conventionally viewed 
as representing the Court’s sociological or institutional legitimacy, as it measures 
78.
79. Gallup notes one 2019 survey on level of support for the Court, which suggests that the 
percentage reporting a great deal or quite a lot of support for the Court held steady from 2018 (37%) to 
2019 (38%). Gallup Historical Trends: Supreme Court, supra note 73. 
80.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74. 
82. Democracy and Government, supra note 80. 
83. Brockway & Jones, supra note 73. 
84.
85. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 7. 
86. See James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Conventional Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 201, 202–03 
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broader public acceptance of the Court as an institution. A critical question con-
cerns the relationship between specific and diffuse support. The conventional 
view is that “levels of diffuse support are relatively immune to short-term 
changes in specific support” and thus individuals do not see the Court as illegiti-
mate when it issues decisions with which they disagree.87 However, some recent 
scholarship argues that individuals’ diffuse support for the Court decreases as 
they perceive greater ideological disagreement between their views and the 
Court’s decisions—and that even one highly salient decision can affect assess-
ments of the Court’s legitimacy.88 
The threat to the Supreme Court’s sociological legitimacy is clearly more omi-
nous under the latter account. If ideological disagreement with the Court’s deci-
sions can have an immediate and direct impact on the Court’s legitimacy, then 
the growing gap in how Republicans and Democrats view the Court would signal 
an imminent threat to the Court’s broader legitimacy. Yet even under the conven-
tional view, specific and diffuse support are at least generally linked.89 Some 
scholars suggest that individuals keep a “running tally” of decisions, with diffuse 
support for the Court suffering once a sufficient number of disapproved decisions 
have accumulated.90 In the recent past, the presence of Justices who were swing 
voters—voting sometimes with liberals and sometimes with conservatives in 
highly contested cases—meant that the overall ideological tally for the Court was 
mixed.91 No single political or ideological group continuously lost. The danger 
raised by Court’s intensifying ideological and partisan blocs is that this running 
tally will become increasingly one-sided over time, causing the Court’s legiti-
macy to erode for the group that continuously loses. Which group ends up as the 
continuous losers depends on which political and ideological group has control of 
the Court. Not surprisingly, in the face of an increasingly solidly Republican and 
conservative majority, the current concerns about the Court’s eroding legitimacy 
(2014). The terms were originally coined by David Easton in A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 
273 (1965). 
87. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 86, at 206; see generally Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, 
The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635 (1992). 
88. Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme 
Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 185, 197 (2013) (“When individuals 
perceive that they are in ideological disagreement with the Court’s policymaking, they ascribe lower 
legitimacy to the Court compared to individuals who perceive that they are in agreement with the 
Court.”); Dino P. Christenson & David M. Glick, Chief Justice Robert’s Health Care Decision 
Disrobed: The Microfoundations of the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403, 410, 416 
(2014). For criticisms of this scholarship, see James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Legitimacy Grounded in Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 
(2015). 
89. Ura & Merrill, supra note 72, at 434. 
90. See Vanessa A. Baird, Building Institutional Legitimacy: The Role of Procedural Justice, 54 
POL. RES. Q. 333 (2001); Gibson & Nelson, supra note 86, at 206–07. 
91. See Gibson & Nelson, supra note 86, at 208; see also Bartels & Johnston, supra note 88, at 187, 
190–91 & Table 2 (arguing that the contemporary Court could be perceived as conservative, moderate, 
or even liberal, and providing supporting evidence of mixed perceptions of the Court’s ideology by 
survey respondents). 
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are raised largely by Democrats and liberals who view the Court as increasingly 
at odds with their ideological preferences. 
An important additional factor here is that our politics are not only polarized, 
but also highly competitive, with both partisan camps being sizeable and politi-
cally powerful nationally.92 
See Frances Lee, American Politics Is More Competitive Than Ever. That’s Making Partisanship 
Worse, WASH. POST: MONKEYCAGE (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- 
cage/wp/2014/01/09/american-politics-is-more-competitive-than-ever-thats-making-partisanship-worse/ 
[https://perma.cc/53XD-68ZW] (emphasizing that current national “politics is distinctive for its narrow 
and switching national majorities” so that “[n]early every recent election has held out the possibility of a 
shift in party control of one institution or another”). 
As Keith Whittington emphasizes in his Article for 
this symposium, what distinguishes our current polarized age from prior ones is 
that neither side has emerged as the victor.93 This has several worrisome implica-
tions for the sociological legitimacy of the Court. To begin with, the competitive 
nature of our polarized politics means that the group of continuous ideological 
losers at the Court will be large, even at times representing a majority of the 
national electorate.94 Additionally, it seems likely to increase the chances that our 
sharply contested politics, and as a result, ideological divisions over the Court 
will last and not be resolved by elections.95 It may also increase the likelihood of 
the Court being asked to intervene on highly politically salient disputes, with 
both parties unwilling to compromise and more inclined to use the courts to 
secure wins not obtainable through political channels.96 
Sarah Binder, How Political Polarization Creates Stalemate and Undermines Lawmaking, 
WASH. POST: MONKEYCAGE (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/ 
2014/01/13/how-political-polarization-creates-stalemate-and-undermines-lawmaking/ [https://perma. 
cc/VU5Z-MHY5]; Lee, supra note 92; Elbert Lin, States Suing the Federal Government: Protecting 
Liberty or Playing Politics?, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 633, 634–46 (2018); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, 
The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123, 125–26 (2019) (detailing a 
dramatic increase in the federal government’s request for emergency and extraordinary relief from the 
Supreme Court). 
True, the competitive na-
ture of our polarized politics increases the chances that either party could win the 
presidential elections,97 
Geoffrey Skelley, Are Blowout Elections a Thing of The Past?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 28, 2019) 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-blowout-presidential-elections-a-thing-of-the-past/ [https://perma. 
cc/82WR-T4ZA]; Lee, supra note 92. 
thereby potentially gaining the ability to bring the ideo-
logical balance on the Court more in line with its preferences. But arguably, this 
fact has only intensified perceptions of the Court as political and worsened the 
challenge to the Court’s sociological legitimacy.98 
Sahil Kapur, Democrats Shift to Seize on Supreme Court as 2020 Campaign Issue, BLOOMBERG 
(May 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-17/democrats-shift-to-seize-on- 
supreme-court-as-2020-campaign-issue [https://perma.cc/VD5G-YAT9]; Eric Bradner & Joan Biskupic, 
92.
93. Keith E. Whittington, Practice-Based Constitutional Law in an Era of Polarized Politics, 18 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y , 227, 238 (forthcoming May 2020). 
94. Michael Geruso et al., Inversions in US Presidential Elections: 1836–2016, at 23 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. w26247, 2019). 
95. See Nolan McCarty, Polarization, Congressional Dysfunction, and Constitutional Change, 50 
IND. L. REV. 223, 228–30 (2016). For the argument that predictions of ongoing and lasting polariza- 
tion are exaggerated, see Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional 
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How the Supreme Court Could Shape the 2020 Presidential Race, CNN (Jan. 23, 2019;), https://www. 
cnn.com/2019/01/23/politics/supreme-court-2020-politics/index.html [https://perma.cc/793F-WXGG]; 
see generally Christopher W. Schmidt, The Forgotten Issue? The Supreme Court and the 2016 Election, 
93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 411 (2018). 
The stark divide in partisan perceptions of the Court suggests an additional 
challenge in assessing the Court’s public acceptance and legitimacy. Political sci-
entists focus on public acceptance of the Court writ large, but in reality, there are 
many different publics, of which partisan groupings represent just one. Some po-
litical scientists and journalists divide the country and even North America into 
different “nations” identified by particular historical, cultural and geographic fea-
tures.99 Others emphasize urban-rural distinctions or identify certain represen- 
tative communities as models that repeat across the country.100 
See, e.g., JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE (2019); DANTE CHINNI & JAMES GIMPEL, OUR 
PATCHWORK NATION (2010); Peter Grier, The Deep Roots of America’s Rural-Urban Political Divide, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Dec.16, 2018.), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2018/1226/The- 
deep-roots-of-America-s-rural-urban-political-divide [https://perma.cc/V8B6-ZVLA]. 
Economic, educa-
tional, and demographic differences or factors such as employment or religious 
background also seem likely to be significant to how individuals respond to the 
Court. For example, the Court’s “perceived legitimacy among . . . legal elites is 
extremely high—and much higher than it is for the mass public at large.”101 One 
explanation given is that frequent exposure to the Court means not just greater 
awareness of how well the Court’s decisions accord or diverge from one’s own 
views, but also “expos[ure] to legitimizing symbols . . . that tend to create a pre-
sumption that, even if [an] outcome is undesirable, the process of decision mak-
ing is fair.”102 In contrast, the perspective that white evangelicals take to the 
Court is framed by decades of preaching and religious activism around judicial 
decisions.103 
James Fea, Why Do White Evangelicals Still Staunchly Support Donald Trump?, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 5, 2019.), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/04/05/why-do-white-evangelicals-still- 
staunchly-support-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/7HJA-7P37]. 
The differences among these many publics seem likely to affect 
actual views on the Court’s institutional legitimacy and the resilience of such 
views.104 As important, these differences may make it more difficult to protect 
the Court’s legitimacy. Moves that help prevent the Court from veering too pre-
dictably and consistently in one political direction may undermine the Court’s le-
gitimacy with some publics even as they reinforce the Court’s legitimacy with 
others.105 
99. See, e.g., JOEL GARREAU, THE NINE NATIONS OF NORTH AMERICA (1981); COLIN WOODARD, 
AMERICAN NATIONS: A HISTORY OF ELEVEN RIVAL REGIONAL CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA (2011). 
100.
101. Brandon L. Bartels et al., Lawyers’ Perceptions of the Supreme Court: Is the Court a 
“Political” Institution?, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 761, 764 (2015). 
102. James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Reconsidering Positivity Theory: What Roles do 
Politicization, Ideological Disagreement, and Legal Realism Play in Shaping U.S. Supreme Court 
Legitimacy?, 14 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 592, 593–95 (2017). 
103.
104. Bartels & Johnston, supra note 88, at 185; Brockway & Jones, supra note 73 (noting that 75% 
of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents viewed the Court favorably while only 49% of 
Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents held the same view, an inverse from positions in 
2016). 
105. See Shapiro, supra note 4. 
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Efforts to respond to legitimacy threats facing the Court are further compli-
cated by evidence that the Court’s reasoning, and not just its results, can affect 
the Court’s legitimacy. Notably, recognition that the Justices’ ideological orienta-
tions affect their decision making may not have much of an effect on the Court’s 
legitimacy on its own.106 But perceptions that the Court is politicized, that the 
Justices are “little more than ‘politicians in robes” who engage in “strategic, 
rather than sincere, decision making,” do have a legitimacy-undermining 
effect.107 Of particular relevance is a recent study of public reactions to the sug-
gestion that Chief Justice Roberts switched his vote in NFIB v. Sebelius out of 
institutional legitimacy concerns. It showed that the Court’s legitimacy suffered 
when individuals perceived the Court not just as ideologically misaligned with 
their views, but further as acting politically in issuing a decision.108 Another study 
found that loyalty to the Court was highest when opinions used conventional 
legalistic arguments, but decreased as the Court’s reasoning became more contro-
versial and “extraconstitutional.”109 
B. Is the Court’s Consideration of Sociological Legitimacy Defensible? 
This descriptive data thus suggests that the Court’s legitimacy with broad sec-
tions of the public may be at risk, at least over time, if its decisions go consis-
tently in one ideological direction in politically salient cases. One potential 
solution would be for Justices to vote in a way that ensures more ideological vari-
ety in order to protect public acceptance of the Court. As noted, whether as an 
empirical matter such strategic voting would enhance the Court’s legitimacy is 
debatable, a point I return to below.110 For now, I will focus on the core normative 
question: even if the Court’s decisions can undermine its public standing, should 
the Justices take that impact into account in their decision making? Put into 
Fallon’s terms, is it legally or morally legitimate for the Court to take its sociolog-
ical legitimacy into account in deciding a particular case? Given Fallon’s equa-
tion of legal and moral legitimacy in the U.S. legal system, this is essentially a 
question about whether the Court’s sociological legitimacy is a legally legitimate 
factor. 
An important point to note at the outset is that strategic decision making on the 
Supreme Court is a familiar and well-established phenomenon. Indeed, as mem-
bers of a multi-person court who need to get four colleagues to sign onto their 
opinions to obtain a majority, the Justices necessarily have to pay attention to 
their colleagues’ views in writing their drafts. And Justices sometimes switch 
106. See Gibson & Nelson, supra note 86, at 211–12; see also Christianson & Glick, supra note 88, 
at 415 (impact on legitimacy came when individuals viewed the Court’s decision not just as ideological 
but also as ideologically disaligned with their own views). 
107. See Gibson & Nelson, supra note 102, at 594–95, 598. 
108. Christianson & Glick, supra note 88, at 411. 
109. Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court 
Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 210, 213 (2012). 
110. See infra Part II.C. 
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their votes in response to draft opinions.111 More than this, scholars have argued 
that Justices write their opinions with an eye to the preferences of other institu-
tions, such as Congress, the President, and the public, in order to ensure that their 
opinions—and the policy positions those opinions embody—have staying 
power.112 They may, for example, strategically opt to overrule doctrines incre-
mentally rather than in one fell swoop in order to lessen backlash.113 
A second point is that there are well-known instances of the particular type of 
strategic judicial decision making at issue here, namely, strategic consideration 
of the impact decisions may have on the Supreme Court’s public standing. The 
classic example is Marbury v. Madison, in which the Court heard a challenge to 
Secretary of State James Madison’s refusal to deliver judicial commissions, an 
action taken on President Thomas Jefferson’s instructions. Given the political cli-
mate at the time, not least the perception by Jefferson and his Democratic- 
Republican party of the Court as a Federalist bastion with Marshall at its head, 
the odds that the Jefferson administration would comply with a Court order 
requiring the commissions be delivered were slim. After all, the government 
refused to even come to the Court to defend itself in the action. Marshall’s solu-
tion to this challenge to the young Court’s power, holding that statutes granting 
the Court jurisdiction were unconstitutional, is often invoked as a paragon of judi-
cial strategy. It allowed the Court to simultaneously affirm the principle of judi-
cial review and avoid the danger that the political branches would undercut the 
Court by refusing to comply with its decision.114 
The Court at times has also used justiciability rulings to avoid hearing conten-
tious cases because of concerns about how the public would respond. This 
approach was famously advocated by Alexander Bickel in the early 1960s, who 
urged the Court to exercise prudential judgment—the “passive virtues”—in 
deciding what to hear, out of concern about the impact that the Court’s decisions 
on the merits could have on “public opinion and the political institutions.”115 As 
Grove details, the Court’s infamous denial of jurisdiction in Naim v. Naim, refus-
ing to hear a challenge to Virginia’s prohibition on interracial marriage that was 
squarely within its mandatory jurisdiction, resulted from concerns that reaching 
111. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 12–13, 17 (1998); Forest 
Maltzman & Paul Wahlbeck, Strategic Considerations and Vote Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 581, 582, 591 (1996)). 
112. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 111, at 13–17, 138–77; see generally Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael 
Gely, Strategic Judicial Decision Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS (Keith E. 
Whittington et al. eds., 2008) (providing an overview of strategic theories of judicial decision making). 
113. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. 
Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010). 
114. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 2; see 
also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of 
Doctrinal Tension, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16–20, 27–33 (2003). 
115. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 48, 54, 69–70, 129 (1962); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: 
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42, 48, 51 (1961). 
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the merits and invalidating the ban would create more resistance to Brown v. 
Board of Education and school desegregation.116 Some have described the 
Court’s decision that standing was lacking and it had no jurisdiction in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry as reflecting, in part, the sense that the country was not 
yet ready for the Supreme Court to pronounce on the constitutionality of state 
prohibitions on same sex marriage.117 The fact that the Court enjoys broad discre-
tion over the cases it hears means that denials of certiorari are an easily available 
and largely non-public means by which the Court can avoid cases that might 
prove particularly contentious and provoke sharp public response.118 
See, e.g., Helen Alvare, Symposium: Roe—Or Wait?, SCOTUSBLOG (July 24, 2019), https:// 
www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/symposium-roe-or-wait/ [https://perma.cc/7KUN-WGMG] (describing 
Court’s practice over the 2018 Term of ducking questions about the constitutionality of abortion 
restrictions by not granting certiorari). 
Perhaps the most prominently invoked example of strategic Supreme Court de-
cision making to preserve the Court’s public standing is today the most debatable: 
Justice Owen Roberts’ vote to uphold the constitutionality of Washington’s mini-
mum wage statute challenged in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish after having invali-
dated a nearly identical New York law just the term before.119 Given that West 
Coast Hotel was decided against the backdrop of President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
proposal to pack the Court, a proposal that lost steam when the Court started 
upholding New Deal economic regulation, Roberts’ vote was long heralded as 
the switch-in-time-that-saved-nine.120 Subsequent revisionary scholarship has 
called that view into question, arguing that Roberts had voted in West Coast 
before the court-packing plan was released and reflected a longer term evolution 
in his legal views.121 Yet even if Roberts’ vote was based in legal principles and 
not just a response to head off a political threat to the Court, most scholars see the 
evolution in the Court’s views towards New Deal economic measures as also 
influenced by the changing public climate.122 Indeed, studies of the Court by both 
legal and political science scholars demonstrate that the Court often aligns with 
public opinion.123 
More recently, the issue of whether Justices decide cases to protect the Court’s 
legitimacy rose to the fore in the aftermath of NFIB v. Sebelius, which upheld the 
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate.124 Reports soon emerged of Chief 
116. Grove, supra note 5, at 2257–58. 
117. Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 127, 144–46 (2013). 
118.
119. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 
298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
120. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 213–36 (1995); Laura Kalman, 
The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052 (2005). 
121. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 5–7 (1998); Richard D. Friedman, 
Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1900–02 (1994). 
122. See Friedman, supra note 121, at 1952; Kalman, supra note 120, at 1075–79. 
123. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 2. 
124. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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Justice Roberts having switched his vote to supporting the mandate’s constitu-
tionality out of concern over the public fallout the Court might face were it to in-
validate the most important social welfare legislation of a generation.125 
JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF 221–22, 233–48 (2019) (discussing changes in Roberts’ votes on the 
mandate, and of the votes of Roberts, Kagan, and Breyer on the Medicaid expansion); Jan Crawford, 




Roberts in fact did so remains a matter of debate.126 For many ACA opponents, 
however, it was the possibility of such a “Roberts flip” that threatened the Court’s 
public reputation.127 
Matthew J. Franck, The Chief Don’t Get No Respect, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 29, 2012), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/chief-dont-get-no-respect-matthew-j-franck/ [https:// 
perma.cc/E2DK-EGQD] (“[T]he chorus seems to be ‘the chief justice behaved politically,’ and then 
that putative behavior is either praised or blamed.”); Robert J. Pushaw Jr., The Paradox of the 
Obamacare Decision: How Can the Federal Government Have Limited Unlimited Power?, 65 FLA. L. 
REV. 1993, 1997 (2013). 
To be sure, these are all instances of implicit strategic consideration of the 
Court’s public standing. Explicit reference also occurs, but more rarely. The lead-
ing example comes from the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The 
joint opinion invoked the Court’s public legitimacy as an additional reason for it 
to adhere to its past decision in Roe v. Wade: 
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in 
such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in 
Roe . . . its decision requires an equally rare precedential force to counter the 
inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart its implementation. . . . [T]o over-
rule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a 
watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious 
question.128 
Concern about the impact overruling a decision may have on “public faith in 
the judiciary” has surfaced in other stare decisis analyses.129 But stare decisis is 
not the only context in which the Court has taken public reaction into account in 
its decision making. According to one study, “The justices have made seventy- 
one . . . references to the Court’s institutional legitimacy” since Brown was 
decided in 1954.130 Nearly all members of the Roberts Court have signed onto 
125.
126. See Jonathan Adler, Judicial Minimalism, the Mandate, and Mr. Roberts, in THE HEALTH CARE 
CASE 171 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013) (arguing that Roberts’ decision in NFIB was “of a piece 
with his prior opinions as a justice and circuit court judge and his accounts of the proper judicial role”); 
Grove, supra note 5, at 2255. 
127.
128. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). 
129. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991); Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1107, 1115–20 (1995). 
130. Farganis, supra note 109, at 207 ; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES 
MAKE 46–49 (1998). 
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opinions in recent years that invoke the need to preserve “public confidence” in 
the Court as a justification for their rulings.131 
Some Justices expressly have invoked the Court’s legitimacy as reason for the 
Court to adhere to a limited role and, in particular, to sidestep highly political dis-
putes. Justice Frankfurter famously insisted that “[t]he Court’s authority— 
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public 
confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s 
complete detachment . . . from political entanglements and by abstention from 
injecting itself into the clash of political forces.”132 In recent years, Chief Justice 
Roberts has channeled this Frankfurtian view, arguing that the Court needs to 
hew to a narrow role to preserve its legitimacy.133 During oral argument in Gill v. 
Whitford in 2018, Roberts stated that “the main problem” he had with finding par-
tisan gerrymandering unconstitutional is that such a determination would threaten 
the Court’s public standing: 
We will have to decide in every case whether the Democrats win or the 
Republicans win. . . . [L]et’s say . . . the Democrats win . . . [a]nd the intelligent 
man on the street is going to say . . . [i]t must be because the Supreme Court 
preferred the Democrats over the Republicans. And that is going to cause very 
serious harm to the status and integrity of the decisions of this Court in the 
eyes of the country.134 
And despite his criticism of the Casey joint opinion’s invocation of legitimacy, 
Justice Scalia raised a similar fear in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, noting 
that the Court’s legitimacy might be eroded by its lack of restraint in invalidating 
state prohibitions on same sex marriage.135 
Strategic consideration of public reaction to judicial decisions is thus a long-
standing and ongoing phenomenon at the Supreme Court, but it is nonetheless 
controversial. Casey’s argument that the Court should refrain from overruling 
past decisions in “intensely divisive” contexts met sharp criticism from both 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in their respective dissents. Some of 
131. The exception is Kavanaugh, reflecting his recent appointment to the Court. See, e.g., Carpenter 
v. United States., 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“When judges abandon legal 
judgment for political will we . . . risk undermining public confidence in the courts themselves.”); Buck 
v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759 (Roberts, CJ., joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan and Sotomayor, JJ.) 
(“Relying on race to impose a criminal sanction poisons public confidence in the judicial process, . . . a 
concern that supports Rule 60(b)(6) relief.”) (internal quotations omitted); Whole Women’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct. 2292, 2391 (2015) (Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Thomas, dissenting) (“The Court’s patent refusal to apply well-established law in a neutral way is 
indefensible and will undermine public confidence in the Court as a fair and neutral arbiter.”). 
132. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
133. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 143, 256 (2005). 
134. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–38, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161); 
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 505, 505–06 (2018). 
135. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2627–29 (2015). 
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this criticism underscored the tension between the joint opinion’s insistence on 
sticking with precedent when under popular fire and the multiple ways in which it 
simultaneously deviated from the precedent of Roe.136 The dissents further 
insisted, however, that the Court should not consider how it would be publicly 
viewed in reaching its decisions at all. According to the Chief Justice, “[t]he 
Judicial Branch derives its legitimacy, not from following public opinion, but 
from deciding by its best lights whether legislative enactments of the popular 
branches of Government comport with the Constitution.”137 Justice Scalia made a 
similar point, bluntly stating that “whether it would ‘subvert the Court’s legiti-
macy’ or not, the notion that we would decide a case differently from the way we 
otherwise would have in order to show that we can stand firm against public dis-
approval is frightening.”138 
Recently, Tara Grove has developed this point further, arguing that that it is 
not legally legitimate under any interpretive theory for the Court to decide a 
case based on concerns about its sociological legitimacy. Grove focuses on 
“switches,” instances in which “one or more Justices is said to have ruled in a 
way that they believed to be legally incorrect . . . in order to protect the Court.”139 
Switches, in her view, would “violate norms of consistency, good faith, and can-
dor,”140 and she notes that “the Justices . . . are most certainly not candid about 
‘caving’ to public pressure.”141 She argues that a switch may even be at odds with 
the case and controversy requirement of Article III, insofar as it means that a 
Justice is not focusing “on the case or controversy before her.”142 In her view, the 
Court faces an unavoidable “legitimacy trade-off”: “a steadfast commitment to 
legal legitimacy may put at risk the Court’s sociological legitimacy,” but at the 
same time “a steadfast commitment to sociological legitimacy may lead a Justice 
to compromise the legal legitimacy of her own rulings.”143 
Such rejections of consideration of sociological legitimacy are hard to square 
with the Justices’ practice of regularly invoking the Court’s public standing in 
their opinions. One way of resolving this inconsistency is to be clearer about how 
exactly sociological legitimacy might factor into a Justice’s decision making. 
Sociological legitimacy might be simply one factor among many that leads a 
Justice to a particular decision. Alternatively, it might be the only factor a Justice 
considers or, as in Grove’s switch category, a Justice might decide based on 
sociological legitimacy and contrary to her view of the law. Although even the 
136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–64, 957–64 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting); id. at 998–1000 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
137. Id. at 963 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
138. Id. at 998 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
139. Grove, supra note 5, at 2259. 
140. Id. at 2262. 
141. Id. at 2245. 
142. Id. at 2262. 
143. Id. at 2272. Other scholars agree. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Loving v. Virginia: A Triumph and a 
Failure of the Supreme Court, 25 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 259 (2018) (“The Court’s job is to enforce the 
Constitution . . . whatever the public reaction.”). 
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first, limited consideration of sociological legitimacy might be problematic for 
some theories of interpretation, on the whole it does not trigger much concern. 
The latter versions of taking sociological legitimacy into account are far more 
contentious. This distinction is evident in the actions of the Justices. When the 
Justices invoke sociological legitimacy, it is overwhelmingly used as an addi-
tional reason to reach a certain result and not the sole basis for decision. What 
makes the joint opinion in Casey stand out is its oblique suggestion that preserv-
ing the Court’s public status should outweigh the correct view of the law. 
Notably, however, the joint opinion does not argue that sociological legitimacy 
should be the determining factor, and it is mentioned alongside both more stand-
ard stare decisis factors and a lengthy constitutional analysis. 
Yet, even the concerns about more extreme consideration of sociological legit-
imacy also seems exaggerated. To begin with, such instances seem likely to be 
quite rare. This is particularly true of switches, because it seems improbable that 
a Justice would decide the legal merits before considering the public impact of a 
case, rather than taking the public impact into account in the course of deciding 
what the correct outcome is. If nothing else, theories of motivated reasoning sug-
gest that the Justices’ desire to avoid outcomes that will harm the public standing 
of the Court will lead them to shade their assessment of the legal merits.144 Nor is 
it necessarily problematic for a Justice to reconsider her initial instincts on the 
legal merits because of the possible impact of such a view on the Court’s public 
standing. Much would depend on how she ultimately reasoned to her new posi-
tion and how she might approach analogous cases in the future. Even if sociologi-
cal legitimacy concerns drove Chief Justice Roberts’ decision in NFIB, his 
opinion explaining why the individual mandate should be deemed a constitutional 
tax accorded with the Constitution’s text, structure, and history and was sup-
ported by Supreme Court precedent on the scope of the tax power.145 And if 
Roberts adheres consistently to that view going forward, suggesting that he was 
led not just to a different result in a particular case but more broadly to reconsider 
his understanding of the tax power, it would be hard to call his decision making 
entirely unprincipled. 
Moreover, assessments of a decision’s external effects are not categorically 
excluded from legally legitimate decision making. To the contrary, examination 
of whether a decision would be at odds with public reliance or whether a line of 
doctrine has proven unworkable in practice are an essential part of the doctrine of 
stare decisis—a doctrine the Court has identified as “a foundation stone of the 
rule of law” that sometimes requires the Court to adhere to determinations that  
144. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011); Michael L. 
Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 911, 1026–27 
(2007). 
145. Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 88–93 (2012). 
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are settled over those it believes to be right.146 Although stare decisis has become 
a source of dispute on the Court as of late, only Justice Thomas has called for rev-
ocation of the doctrine, and his argument against it rests on the broader point that 
judges exceed their constitutional power if they adhere to decisions they believe 
are demonstrably incorrect.147 Concerns about workability, judicial capacity, and 
interbranch relations also lie at the core of many political question decisions and 
other justiciability doctrines.148 
Perhaps most significantly, the importance of public acceptance of the Court to 
its ability to function effectively and “surviv[e] as a viable institution”149 provides 
a principled reason for the Justices to consider sociological legitimacy. Put differ-
ently, ensuring that the Court can perform its constitutional role effectively is 
itself of constitutional importance. Although we often focus on the Constitution’s 
concern to constrain the branches of government, constructing an effective gov-
ernment is also a constitutional goal.150 Deborah Hellman has argued that the 
Court’s “ability to justifiably compel compliance with its rulings in particular 
cases” requires that it “be effective enough to compel compliance with its pro-
nouncements generally. . . . [I]f the Court can protect its effectiveness through 
safeguarding its image, [it] . . . ought to do so.”151 At a minimum, therefore, pre-
serving the sociological legitimacy of the Court should be seen as a functional 
prerequisite for principled legal decision making and not just as a potential threat. 
Consideration of the Court’s public standing also appears to accord with 
Fallon’s account of constitutional adjudication. Like others, Fallon insists on the 
importance of adherence to principle, but he also insists that principled decision 
making does not preclude judicial attention to moral, prudential, and political 
concerns. The impact of sociological legitimacy on the Court’s effectiveness is a 
central prudential factor. Moreover, Fallon himself suggests that preserving the 
Court’s effectiveness carries moral significance as well: “[W]e should remember 
throughout that enhanced sociological legitimacy is morally relevant insofar as it 
seems necessary to sustain a climate of mutual respect among citizens and of  
146. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty, 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 
2422–23 (2019). 
147. See Gamble v. United States, 139 U.S. 1960, 1981–89 (2019). 
148. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2500–01 (2019) (holding that partisan 
gerrymandering claims represent nonjusticiable political questions because there are no “clear, 
manageable, and politically neutral” standard for determining when partisan districting is unfair and 
goes too far); Vieth v. Jubiler, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004) (plurality) (referencing the need for a 
determinate judicial standard “to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a process that is the 
very foundation of democratic decisionmaking”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577–78 
(1992) (invoking concerns about the courts and Congress intruding excessively on the executive in 
finding no standing). 
149. Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between 
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 213, 216–21 (1968). 
150. Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The 
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2017). 
151. Hellman, supra note 129, at 1139. 
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recognition by citizens of the government’s right to rule.”152 Finally, Fallon’s dis-
cussion of judicial restraint suggests yet another reason why the Court’s consider-
ation of its public standing is legitimate: the close overlap between strategic and 
substantive arguments over the political ramifications of the Court’s actions. 
Disentangling these two will often prove difficult; the strategic concern that the 
public will see the Court as overstepping its proper constitutional role and intrud-
ing on the political sphere is likely to go hand-in-hand with the substantive con-
cern that the Court is in fact overstepping. Allowing the substantive version into 
the realm of legitimate constitutional adjudication thus likely means bringing its 
strategic twin in as well. 
C. Candor and Sociological Legitimacy 
Therefore, I believe it can be legally legitimate for the Justices to consider the 
Court’s sociological legitimacy in their decision making and perhaps even to 
decide cases based on sociological legitimacy concerns. Whether such considera-
tion is actually legitimate in practice is a different question. Much turns on how 
and why the Justices take sociological legitimacy into account, as well as the spe-
cific features of the case at hand. 
In particular, the Justices’ consideration of the Court’s sociological legitimacy 
would need to accord with the norms of good-faith, reasonable constitutional 
adjudication. As a result, instances in which a Justice would be justified in decid-
ing solely on sociological legitimacy are extremely rare, at best; the threat to the 
Court’s public standing would need to be dire to justify such a deviation from 
usual constitutional practice. Even in more likely scenarios, when sociological le-
gitimacy enters a Justice’s decisional calculus simply as one of many factors, 
Justices may be faulted for giving it undue weight or miscalculating what the pu-
bic impact of a decision would be. As Luis Fuentes-Rohwer has suggested, a real 
danger exists of the Justices crying wolf; given the generally high levels of public 
approval of the Court, there often should be a more than sufficient buffer for the 
Court to issue an unpopular or castigated decision and still enjoy substantial 
sociological legitimacy.153 Grove similarly warns that the Justices may not be 
particularly good at assessing when their decisions pose a risk to the Court’s legit-
imacy, and the ongoing debate over diffuse support for the Court suggests those 
assessments are difficult to make.154 This likelihood of error is exacerbated by the 
presence of multiple publics, as noted above.155 Studies suggest that Judges are 
particularly attuned to the audiences they are close to, such as legal elites.156 But 
they may be less able to predict how other audiences will respond to their deci-
sions, and selective attentiveness to only some publics seems unjustifiably 
152. FALLON, supra note 5, at 159. 
153. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 134, at 519-23. 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88; Grove, supra note 5, at 1168; LAWRENCE BAUM, 
JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 64–66 (2006). 
155. See supra text accompanying notes 99–104. 
156. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 65 at 39-57; BAUM, supra note 155, at 23, 70, 162–64. 
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partial.. Finally, whether a specific Justice is justified in considering sociological 
legitimacy will also turn on her own interpretive theory. If a Justice espouses an 
interpretive theory that demands decisions be based on specific sources, such as 
originalists who argue that constitutional interpretation must depend on the origi-
nal public meaning of the Constitution’s text, then for the Justice to actually 
decide based on sociological legitimacy would be at odds with the obligations of 
good faith and consistency in constitutional adjudication.157 
An especially difficult question relates to whether the Justices must be candid 
about considering the Court’s public standing in deciding a case. Judicial candor 
is often identified as essential to legitimate judicial decision making, a position 
that accords with Fallon’s emphasis on good-faith, reasoned adjudication as the 
core of our constitutional practice.158 Intuitively, judicial candor would appear 
especially important here, given doubts about the legal legitimacy of Justices con-
sidering the Court’s sociological legitimacy at all. Absent candor, it will be hard 
for outside actors to assess whether a Justice’s consideration of sociological legit-
imacy in a particular context was justified or for our constitutional practice to de-
velop norms about when such consideration is legally legitimate. Not requiring 
candor might also lead to excessive reliance on sociological legitimacy in judicial 
decision making, making the Justices too free to consider the public impact of 
their decisions because they can do so without suffering the constraints of public 
criticism.159 
The problem is that judicial candor about considering the public impact of the 
Court’s decisions may be particularly harmful to the Court’s public standing. 
This danger is highlighted by the studies emphasizing that how judges reason 
may matter as much as the decisions they reach.160 If paying attention to the pub-
lic impact of the Court’s decisions makes the public see the Justices more like 
politicians or conclude the Justices are acting extraconstitutionally, then the 
Justices’ candor may cause the very damage to the Court’s sociological legiti-
macy that they were trying to avoid. 
One response would be to exempt the Justices from the requirements of judi-
cial candor when doing so protects the Court’s public standing. Michael Wells 
has advocated such an approach, arguing that “putting an attractive face on its rul-
ings may serve the Court’s vital institutional need for public confidence.”161 In 
his view, the central importance of preserving the Court’s sociological legitimacy 
justifies the Court’s engagement in appearance management when describing its 
157. See supra text accompanying note 50.; Grove, supra note 5, at 2263–64. 
158. See Richard H. Fallon, Essay: A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265, 2266 
(2017). 
159. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 732, 737 (1987) (“In a 
sense, candor is the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations 
imposed by constitutions, statutes and precedents count for little if judges free to believe one thing about 
them and say another.”); see also Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 988–90 
(2008) (canvassing arguments for and against judicial candor). 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 106–109. 
161. Wells, supra note 144, at 1014. 
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reasoning and as a result offering those reasons that the public will accept instead 
of full candor.162 Some might question whether broad judicial candor (as opposed 
to candor in discussions with other judges) is really likely to yield a more ac-
countable and careful approach to the role of sociological legitimacy in judicial 
decision making.163 It seems also possible that fears of public criticism might 
make Justices wary of developing a coherent, higher profile account of when to 
take that impact into account, leading them instead to adopt an ad hoc stance or 
just forego consideration of public impact altogether. Indeed, the extent to which 
legally legitimate decision making requires full disclosure of all the factors a 
judge considers, or whether selective disclosure or even mere avoidance of inten-
tional deception would suffice to meet the requirements of reasoned adjudication, 
is a matter of some debate.164 
Fallon, however, appears committed to candor, identifying reasoned judicial 
argumentation undertaken in good faith as essential for legally legitimate judicial 
decision making. At least under his account, therefore, some judicial candor 
about considering the public impact of a decision would seem to be required. 
Interestingly, in an earlier article, Fallon acknowledged gradations in the candor 
requirements, distinguishing between the obligation and the ideal of judicial can-
dor. On his view, judges “who offer what look on the surface to be reasons for 
their decisions but provide scant insight into their actual reasoning or the diffi-
culty of a legal problem . . . fall far short of the ideal,” yet “normally do not 
breach an obligation of candor,” absent “a willful effort to deceive or the utter 
unintelligibility of proffered legal reasoning.”165 This account might create an 
opening for Justices to forego discussing concerns about the impact a decision 
might have on the Court’s public standing when that impact does not play a sig-
nificant or determinative role in their decision making. But that would still require 
the Justices to be candid in cases in which they put heavy reliance on the effect a 
decision might have on the Court’s public standing—arguably, the very instances 
that will make the Court look most politicized. 
An alternative approach might be to question whether the Justices’ acknowl-
edging that they considered the impact of a decision on how the Court is viewed 
would in fact undercut the Court’s sociological legitimacy. Arguably, such 
162. Id. at 1051. 
163. See Fallon, supra note 159, at 2283–85 (describing how candor might harm judicial decision 
making); Scott C. Idleman, Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1335–57 
(1995) (critiquing several justifications for judicial candor). 
164. Compare, e.g., Fallon, supra note 159, at 2269 (stating reasons minimally, but intelligibility and 
without deception, is sufficient), and Idleman, supra note 164, at 1310 (“[J]udges . . . may regularly 
forgo candor under the principles of logic and prudence and still retain their political legitimacy and 
institutional integrity.”), and Wells, supra note 144, at 1051–54 (arguing that sometimes managing its 
public appearance is more important for the Court than candor) , with Schwartzman, supra note 160, at 
990–91 (arguing that “judges must make public the legal grounds of their decisions” for their decisions 
to be legitimate”); Shapiro, supra note 160, at 737 (“requirement that judges give reasons for their 
decisions . . . serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power”). 
165. Fallon, supra note 159, at 2269. 
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openness might enhance the Court’s standing by demonstrating the Justices’ hon-
esty, especially for those who believe such external factors determine judicial de-
cision making at least as much, if not more, than internal legal ones.166 And it 
would safeguard the Court against potential hits to its legitimacy, should it be 
revealed that the Justices had decided based on sociological legitimacy concerns 
and never acknowledged it. David Shapiro has made this point about judicial can-
dor generally, arguing that “lack of candor seldom goes undetected for long, and 
its detection only serves to increase the level of cynicism about the nature of judg-
ing and of judges.”167 There is something to all these points, and more research is 
clearly needed to determine whether individuals really view judicial considera-
tion of public impact to be purely political and if judges can alleviate that concern 
by greater openness. But the Justices would still face a quandary if they con-
cluded that public acceptance of the Court required that they consider the public 
impact of certain decisions in deciding how to vote, yet they would damage the 
Court’s public standing if they were open about doing so. 
I find myself drawn to a slightly different conclusion. Although judicial candor 
likely does have some flexibility in its joints, I agree with Fallon that an honest 
explanation of the reasons for a decision remains a core demand of our constitu-
tional system. And today’s increasingly ideologically and politically world, both 
on the Court and off, suggests that the Justices cannot simply ignore the impact 
that their decisions may have on public confidence in the Court. Perhaps the 
Justices can take this impact into account openly without undercutting their pub-
lic legitimacy, but the contentiousness over consideration of sociological legiti-
macy suggests that the Justices must do more. Specifically, I think it is incumbent 
on members of the Court to develop a persuasive account of when public confi-
dence is a legitimate consideration in judicial decision making. It is the responsi-
bility of the Justices to convince their many publics that they are indeed acting in 
a legally legitimate manner—acting like judges rather than politicians in robes— 
when they seek to preserve public confidence in the Court. Such an account of 
when sociological legitimacy is a legally legitimate consideration is becoming 
increasingly essential for the Court to navigate our current world of deep and last-
ing partisan and ideological divides.  
166. Cf. Kahan, supra note 144, at 60–63 (suggesting that greater judicial candor about the 
vulnerabilities in their reasoning will dampen “the tendency of those whose identities are threatened by 
the decision to suspect bias by the Court”). 
167. Shapiro, supra note 160, at 737. 
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